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Abstract. Byzantine Quorum Systems is a replication technique used
to ensure availability and consistency of replicates data even in presence
of arbitrary faults. This paper presents a Byzantine Quorum Systems
protocol that provides atomic semantics despite the existence of Byzan-
tine clients and servers. Moreover, this protocol is integrated with a pro-
tocol for proactive recovery of servers. In that way, the system tolerates
any number of failures during its lifetime, since no more than f out of
n servers fail during a small interval of time between recoveries. All so-
lutions proposed in this paper can be used on asynchronous systems,
which requires no time assumptions. The proposed quorum system read
and write protocols have been implemented and their eciency is demon-
strated through some experiments carried out in the Emulab platform.
1 Introduction
Quorum systems [7] are fundamental tools used to ensure consistency and avail-
ability of data stored in replicated servers. Appart from its use in the construc-
tion of synchronization protocols (e.g., consensus), quorum-based protocols for
register implementation are appealing due to their scalability and possibility of
load balancing, since most operations does not need to be executed in all servers,
but only in a subset of them (a quorum). The consistency of the stored data is
ensured by the intersection between every quorum of the system. Quorum sys-
tems can be used to implement registers that provide read and write operations
with several possible semantics (safe, regular or atomic) [8].
The concept of quorum systems was initially proposed for environments in
which servers could be subject to crash faults [7]. Later, the model was extended
to tolerate Byzantine faults [11]. However, the biggest challenge in quorum sys-
tems is how to design ecient protocols that tolerate malicious clients. The
problem is that clients can execute some malicious actions to hurt system prop-
erties, e.g., sending an update only to some servers and not to a complete quorum
[10]. This possibility of misbehaviour should not be discarded since quorum sys-
tems were developed to be used mainly in open systems such as the Internet,
where there is a high probability of at least some clients being malicious.
The rst protocols that tolerate Byzantine clients required at least 4f + 1
servers to tolerate f faults (on servers) [11,12]. However, these protocols does not
completely constraint faulty actions of malicious clients. There are some attacksthat still can be executed, e.g., a malicious client prepare several writes to be
executed by another malicious client (colluder) after its exclusion of the system.
More recently, these weakness were mitigated by the BFT-BC protocol [10],
which requires only 3f +1 servers and allow clients to execute a write only after
its previous write completes. The BFT-BC protocol relies on digital signatures
(one of the biggest latency sources on Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols [4,6])
to constraint the actions of malicious clients.
In this paper we extend BFT-BC and propose a new Byzantine quorum sys-
tem protocol in which the actions of malicious clients are constrained through
threshold cryptography. The main benet of our approach is (1) the use of a sin-
gle public key for the whole storage service (instead of one public key per server),
which simplies the management of the system and make it more aordable in
dynamic environments in which clients come and go, and (2) a considerable re-
duction on the size of message certicates, which makes our protocol much more
ecient than BFT-BC when the number of faults tolerated f increases.
One important property of fault tolerant replicated systems is the bound f on
the number of faulty servers that can be tolerated. This property can be a prob-
lem for long lived systems, since given a sucient amount of time, an adversary
can manage to compromise more than f servers and then impair the correctness
of the system. To overcome this limitation, proactive recovery schemes [4,18]
should be used. In a system in which this kind of technique is employed, each
server is recovered periodically, in such a way that all servers are recovered in
a bounded time interval. This mechanism allows an unlimited number of faults
to be tolerated on the system lifetime, provided that no more than f faults oc-
cur during a recovery period. Another novel feature of our protocols is that the
read/write algorithms were developed together with a proactive recovery scheme
in order to make the register abstraction usefull in long lived systems. As far
as we known, this is the rst generic solution for register implementation that
includes a proactive recovery scheme.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. new quorum system read and write protocols that uses threshold cryptogra-
phy to constraint the actions of malicious clients and ensure the consistency
of the stored data;
2. a proactive recovery scheme for quorum systems that does not suer from
common weakness of previous eorts [18];
3. an experimental evaluation in which we compare our protocol with BFT-
BC and shows the benets (in terms of performance) of using threshold
signatures instead of \common" public key criptography (e.g., RSA).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our system model and
the concept of Byzantine Quorum Systems, among other preliminary denitions
used in this paper. Section 3 describes our proposal for Proactive Byzantine
Quorum Systems. Section 4 presents an analytical analysis and some experiments
realized with our protocols. Some related work are discussed in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 presents our nal remarks and the next steps of this work.2 Background
2.1 System Model
The system model consists of a set C = fc1;c2;:::g of clients interacting with a
set of n servers S = fs1;:::;sng, which implement a quorum system with atomic
semantic operations. Clients and servers have unique identiers.
All the processes in the system (clients and servers) are prone to Byzantine
failures [9]. A process that shows this type of failure may present any behavior:
it may stop, omit transmission and delivery of messages, or arbitrarily deviate
from its specication. A process that present this type of failure behavior is
called faulty, otherwise it is called correct. However, faulty processes may be
recovered, resuming a correct behavior again (proactive recovery). Furthermore,
in this work we assume fault independence for processes, i.e., processes failures
are uncorrelated. This assumption can be substantiated in practice using several
types of diversity [14].
In terms of guarantees, the system remains correct while it presents a maxi-
mum of f faulty servers in a given time, being needed n = 3f + 1 servers in the
system. Furthermore, an unlimited number of clients may be faulty.
We assume the asynchronous system model3, where processes are connected
by a network that may not send, delay, duplicate or corrupt messages. Moreover,
time bounds for message transfers and local computations are unknown in the
system. The only requirement for our protocols to terminate is that, if a process
sends innite times a message to another correct process, then this message
will eventually be delivered in the receiver. To fulll this requirement and to
simplify the presentation of protocols, we consider that communications between
processes are made through reliable and authenticated point-to-point channels.
Also, our protocols use threshold cryptography to constraint the actions of
Byzantine clients and to ensure the integrity of stored data. Thus, we assume
that in the startup of the system each server receives its partial key (a share of a
service secret key [16]) that will be used in the preparation of partial signatures.
A correct server never reveals its partial key. These keys are generated and
distributed by a correct administrator that is only needed in the initialization of
the system. The public key of the service, used to verify the signatures generated
by the combination of signature shares (partial signatures) in this mechanism,
is stored by the servers and is available to any process of the system.
We also assume the existence of a cryptographic hash function h resistant to
collisions, so that any process is able to calculate the hash h(v) from the value
v. It is computationally infeasible to obtain two distinct values v e v0 such that
h(v) = h(v0).
Finally, to avoid replay attacks, some messages are tagged with nonces. We
assume that clients do not choose repeated nonces, i.e., nonces already used.
3 However, the proactive recovery procedure uses some mechanisms to guarantee that
it starts and ends (Section 3.3).2.2 Byzantine Quorum Systems
Byzantine Quorum Sytems [11], hereafter called simply as quorum systems, can
be used to implement replicated data storage systems, ensuring consistency and
availability of the stored data even in the presence of Byzantine faults in some
replicas. Quorum systems algorithms are recognized for their good performance
and scalability, once clients of these systems in fact access only a particular
subset instead of all servers.
Servers in a quorum system are organized into subsets called quorums. Any
two quorums have a nonempty intersection that contains a sucient number
of correct servers (ensuring consistency). Also, there is at least one quorum in
the system that is formed only by correct servers (ensuring availability) [11].
Quorum systems are used to build register abstractions that provide read and
write operations. The data stored on the register is replicated on the servers of
the system. Each register stores a pair hv;ti with a value v of the stored data
and an associated timestamp t.
The protocol presented in this paper is an extension of the BFT-BC [10],
allowing proactive recovery of servers of the system. We choose this protocol
due to its optimal resilience (it requires n = 3f + 1 to tolerate up to f faulty
servers), strong semantics (implements an atomic register [8]) and tolerance to
malicious clients.
In order to use a Byzantine quorum system with only 3f + 1 servers it is
required the stored data to be self-veriable [11]. This is a direct consequence
of the fact that the intersection between any two quorums on this system would
have at least f+1 servers, and thus can contain only a single correct and updated
server. Thus, clients correctly obtain the stored data, from this correct server,
only if the register data is self-veriable, i.e., it is possible to verify the integrity
of the data stored on a single server without consulting other servers. In this
sense, BFT-BC introduces a new way to make data self-veriable: verication
of a set of servers signatures. Other protocols, such as f-dissemination quorum
system [11,12], are based on client signatures and therefore, they do not tolerate
malicious clients4.
Thus, to maintain its consistency semantics, BFT-BC uses a mechanism of
completion proofs signed by servers at all phases of the protocol. To a client be
able to enter in a new phase of the protocol, it is necessary that it presents a proof
that it completed the previous phase. This proof, called certicate, comprises a
set of signed replies collected from a quorum of n   f = 2f + 1 servers in the
previous phase. For example, to a client write some value in the system it needs
to have completed its previous write. By using this technique, BFT-BC employs
2/4 communication steps to execute read operations and 4/6 steps to execute
write operations (Figure 1). The BFT-BC algorithm works as follows:
{ Read operations (Figure 1(a)) { the client requests a set of valid pairs hv;ti
from a quorum of servers and selects that one with the highest timestamp
4 The f-masking quorum system protocol [11,12] also tolerates malicious clients, but
requires replication in 4f + 1 servers, because it does not store self-verifying data.hvh;thi. The operation ends if all returned pairs are equals, i.e., they have
the same timestamp th and the same value vh (this happens in executions
without concurrency and failures). Otherwise, the client performs an addi-
tional phase of write back in the system and waits for conrmations until it
can be assured that a quorum of servers has the most recent value vh;
{ Write operations (Figure 1(b)) { the client obtains a set of timestamps
from a quorum of servers (as in read operations) and then performs the
preparation for its writing. In this phase it tries to obtain from a quorum of
servers a set of proofs necessary to complete its current write operation. In
case of success in the preparation, the client writes on a quorum of servers,
waiting for conrmations. In an alternative scenario, the client may run
an optimized protocol, performing in a single phase the both timestamp
denition and write preparation (dotted lines in Figure 1(b)).
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Fig.1. BFT-BC Read/Write Operations.
2.3 Threshold Cryptography
The main mechanism used in this work is a threshold signature scheme (TSS)
[16] by which it is possible to control actions of clients and to ensure the integrity
of the data stored by servers. Its exibility also facilitates the servers recovery
procedure. In a scheme (n;k)-TSS, a trusted dealer initially generates n secret
key shares (partial keys) (SK1;:::;SKn), n verication keys (V K1;:::;V Kn), the
group verication key V K and the public key PK used to validate signatures.
Moreover, the dealer sends these keys to n dierent players, called share hold-
ers. Thus, each share holder i receives its partial key SKi and its verication
key V Ki. The public key and all verication keys are available for any part that
composes the system.
After this initial setup, the system is able to generate signatures. To obtain
a signature A to some data d, each share holder i generates its partial signature
ai (also called signature share) of d. Later, a combiner obtains at least k valid
partial signatures (a1;:::;ak) and builds the signature A through the combina-
tion of these k valid partial signatures. An important feature of this scheme is
the impossibility of generating valid signatures with less than k valid partial
signatures. This scheme is based on the following primitives:{ Thresh Sign(SKi;V Ki;V K;data): function used by the share holder i to
generate its partial signature ai to data and the proofs vi of validity of ai,
i.e.,hai;vii;
{ Thresh VerifyS(data;hai;vii;PK;V K;V Ki): function used to verify if the
partial signature ai, obtained from the share holder i, is valid for data;
{ Thresh CombineS(a1;:::;ak;PK): function used by the combiner to compose
signature A from k valid partial signatures;
{ verify(data;A;PK): function used to verify if A is a valid signature of data.
In this work, we use the protocol proposed in [16], where it is proved that such
a scheme is secure in the random oracles model [2], not being possible to forge
signatures. This protocol represents a RSA [15] threshold signature scheme, i.e.,
the combination of partial signatures generates a RSA signature. In this model,
the generation and verication of partial signatures is fully non-interactive, not
being necessary to exchange messages to perform these operations.
3 Proactive Byzantine Quorum Systems
This section presents our approach to build a register that oers read and write
operations, implemented through Byzantine quorum replication. Our protocol
is based on BFT-BC [10] and therefore is able to tolerate malicious clients. The
main feature introduced in our protocol is the possibility of proactive recovery
of servers (Section 3.3), and thus it is called PBFT-BC (proactive Byzantine
fault-tolerance for Byzantine clients). Moreover, PBFT-BC outperforms BFT-
BC (Section 4) and also presents optimal resilience (n = 3f + 1).
A Byzantine quorum system should tolerate the presence of malicious clients,
since they can perform the following actions to corrupt the system [10]: (i) write
dierent values associated with the same timestamp; (ii) execute the protocol
partially, updating the value stored by only some (few) servers; (iii) choose a
very large timestamp and exhaust the timestamp space; and (iv) issue a large
number of write requests and hand them o to a colluder who will run them
after the bad client has been removed from the system.
Thus, protocols developed for this purpose should make impossible for ma-
licious clients to perform these actions (or mask them). Our protocol uses a
threshold signature scheme to control the actions performed by clients and to
ensure the integrity of stored data. We consider the existence of a correct ad-
ministrator who will perform the distribution function (dealer) of the scheme,
where servers act as share holders and clients as combiners. The administrator
generates the partial keys and distributes them to the servers. Also, all public
information (public and verication keys) are sent to all servers. Thereafter, each
client gets these public information from the servers by sending a request and
waiting for f+1 identical replies. Notice that the administrator is only necessary
in the initialization of the system, during the setup phase.
Our protocol uses quorums of 2f + 1 replicas and a (n;2f + 1)-TSS scheme,
i.e., it is required a quorum of servers in order to generate a valid signature. Thus,
all actions performed by clients must be authorized by a quorum of servers.Clients need to prove that they are acting properly to move from one phase
to another phase of the protocol. They do it by using certicates, which contain
data indicating the validity of the actions that they are trying to execute and
a signature that ensures the integrity of these data. This signature is generated
by the (n;2f + 1)-TSS scheme ensuring that a quorum of servers approved its
actions. Our protocols use two kinds of certicates:
Prepare Certicate: A client uses this certicate to prove that its writing was
approved by at least a quorum of servers. On the other hand, servers use it to
prove the integrity of the stored values. A prepare certicate pc has three elds:
pc:ts { timestamp of the proposed write; pc:hash { hash of the value v proposed
in the write; pc:A { service signature, proving that at least a quorum of servers
approve the write of v with timestamp pc:ts. A prepare certicate pc is valid only
if its signature pc:A, for the tuple hpc:ts;pc:hashi, is valid. This is determined
by the operation verify(hpc:ts;pc:hashi;pc:A;PK).
Write Certicate: A client uses this certicate to prove that its last write has
been completed. A write certicate wc has two elds: wc:ts { timestamp of the
completed write; wc:A { service signature, proving that the client has done the
write with timestamp wc:ts in at least a quorum of servers. A write certicate
wc is valid only if its signature wc:A, for wc:ts, is valid. This is determined by
the operation verify(wc:ts;wc:A;PK).
PBFT-BC can deal with multiple objects, since each of them has a distinct
identier. However, to simplify the presentation, we consider that servers store
only a single register. Thus, each server i stores the following variables: (1) data
{ value of the object; (2) Pcert { a prepare certicate valid for data; (3) Plist { a
set of tuples hc;ts;hashi containing the client identier c, the timestamp ts and
the hash hash of the value of a proposed write; (4) maxts { timestamp of the
latest write that i knows that was completed in at least a quorum of servers; (5)
SKi { partial key of i, that is used by the threshold signature scheme; (6) V Ki
e V K { verication keys, that are used to generate proofs of validity of partial
signatures; and (7) PK { service public key, that is used to validate certicates.
Moreover, each client c uses the following variables: (1) Wcert { write certicate
of the last write of c; (2) PK { service public key, that is used to validate
certicates; and (3) V K e V K1;:::;V Kn { verication keys, that are used to
validate partial signatures.
3.1 Read and Write Protocols
This section presents PBFT-BC's read and write protocols. We present the pseu-
docodes for each one of the operations and discuss their main features.
Clients should choose timestamps from dierent subsets in order to these pro-
tocols work properly. Thus, each client concatenates its unique identier with a
sequence number, i.e., ts = hseq;idi. Timestamps are compared through their se-
quence number. If two timestamps have the same sequence number, then they are
compared through their client identier. Timestamps are incremented through
the function succ(ts;c) = hts:seq + 1;ci.Pseudocodes 1 and 2 present the write protocol executed by clients and
servers, respectively. These pseudocodes represent the write version without op-
timizations, that demands three phases to complete a write operation.
Pseudocode 1 Protocol used by client c to write value.
w1:1 Client c sends a message hREAD TS;noncei to all servers.
w1:2 c waits for a quorum (2f + 1) of valid replies from dierent servers. A reply mi from
server i is valid if it is well-formed, i.e., mi = hREAD TS REPLY;p;noncei where p is
a valid prepare certicate (well-formed and the service signature is valid). Moreover, mi
should be correctly authenticated, i.e., its nonce matches the nonce used in step w1:1.
w1:3 Among the prepare certicates received in step w1:2, c selects the certicate containing
the highest timestamp, called Pmax.
w2:1 c sends a message hPREPARE;Pmax;ts;h(value);Wcerti to all servers. Here ts  
succ(Pmax:ts;c), h is a hash function and Wcert is a write certicate of c's last write
or null if this is c's rst write.
w2:2 c waits for a quorum (2f + 1) of valid replies from dierent servers. A reply mi from
server i is valid if it is well-formed, i.e., mi = hPREPARE REPLY;htsi;hashii;hai;viii
where tsi and hashi match the values sent in step w2:1 (ts and h(value), respectively).
Moreover, mi is valid if Thresh verifyS(htsi;hashii;hai;vii;PK;V K;V Ki) is true.
w2:3 c combines the 2f + 1 correct signature shares received in step w2:2, invoking
Thresh combineS(a1;:::;a2f+1;PK), and obtains the service signature A for the pair
hts;h(value)i. Then, c forms a prepare certicate Pnew for ts and h(value) by using A.
w3:1 c sends a message hWRITE;value;Pnewi to all replicas.
w3:2 c waits for a quorum (2f+1) of valid replies from dierent servers. A reply mi from server
i is valid if it is well-formed, i.e., mi = hWRITE REPLY;tsi;hai;viii where tsi matches
the value ts dened in step w2:1 and Thresh verifyS(tsi;hai;vii;PK;V K;V Ki) is true.
w3:3 c combines the 2f + 1 correct signature shares received in step w3:2, invoking
Thresh combineS(a1;:::;a2f+1;PK), and obtains the service signature A for the times-
tamp ts. Then, c forms a write certicate Wcert for ts by using A. This certicate is
used in c's next write.
In the rst phase of the protocol the client denes the write timestamp and in
the second phase it obtains a prepare certicate for this write operation. After-
wards, the write operation is denitely executed in the third phase. The progress
of the protocol (i.e., for a client moves from one phase to another) is based on
the use of certicates. The processing related with these certicates is one of the
dierences between PBFT-BC and BFT-BC (also, PBFT-BC provides protocols
to recover servers periodically { Section 3.3). On PBFT-BC, a client obtains a
certicate by waiting for a quorum of valid partial signatures (steps w2:2 e w3:2)
and, then, combining them (steps w2:3 e w3:3), what results in a signature that
is used to prove the validity of this certicate. Notice that to validate a certi-
cate it is necessary to verify only one signature (service signature), diering from
BFT-BC where a full quorum of signatures must be veried.
The most important phase of the write protocol is the second one. In this
phase each server (Pseudocode 2) checks if: (1) the timestamp being proposed
is correct; (2) the client is preparing just one write; (3) the value being pre-
pared does not dier from a (possible) previous prepared value with the same
timestamp; and (4) the client has completed its previous write. The item (1) is
checked in the step w2:1. The items (2), (3) and (4) are checked in the steps w2:2
and w2:3, where each server uses its list of prepared writes (Plist). An importantfeature related with the use of this list is that a client is not able to prepare
many write requests. Thus, a malicious client m is not able to prepare multiple
write requests and hand them o to a colluder, that could execute them after m
is removed from the system, what limits the damage caused by malicious clients.
Pseudocode 2 Write protocol executed at server i.
Upon receipt of hREAD TS;noncei from client c
w1:1 i sends a reply hREAD TS REPLY;Pcert;noncei to c.
Upon receipt of hPREPARE;Pc;ts;hash;Wci from client c
w2:1 if the request is invalid or ts 6= succ(Pc:ts;c), discard request without replying to c. A
PREPARE request is invalid if either certicate Pc or Wc is invalid (not well-formed
or the service signature is not valid).
w2:2 if Wc is not null, set maxts   max(maxts;Wc:ts), and remove from Plist all entries
e such that e:ts  maxts.
w2:3 if Plist contains an entry for c with a dierent ts or hash, discard the request without
replying to c.
w2:4 if hc;ts;hashi 62 Plist and ts > maxts, add hc;ts;hashi to Plist.
w2:5 i generates its signature share (partial signature):
hai;vii   Thresh sign(SKi;V Ki;V K;hts;hashi).
w2:6 i sends a reply hPREPARE REPLY;hts;hashi;hai;viii to c.
Upon receipt of hWRITE;value;Pnewi from client c
w3:1 if request is invalid or Pnew:hash 6= h(value), discard request without replying to c.
A write request is invalid if the prepare certicate Pnew is invalid (not well-formed or
the service signature is not valid).
w3:2 if Pnew:ts > Pcert:ts, set data   value and Pcert   Pnew.
w3:3 i generates its signature share (partial signature):
hai;vii   Thresh sign(SKi;;V Ki;V K;Pnew:ts).
w3:4 i sends a reply hWRITE REPLY;Pnew:ts;hai;viii to c.
Pseudocode 3 Read protocol executed at client c.
r1:1 Client c sends a message hREAD;noncei to all servers.
r1:2 c waits for a quorum (2f + 1) of valid replies from dierent servers. A reply mi from
server i is valid if it is well-formed, i.e., mi = hREAD REPLY;value;p;noncei where
p is a valid prepare certicate (well-formed and the service signature is valid) and
p:hash = h(value). Moreover, mi should be correctly authenticated, i.e., its nonce
matches the nonce used in step r1:1.
r1:3 Among all replies received in step r1:2, c selects the reply with the prepare certicate
containing the highest timestamp and returns the value related with this reply. Also, if
all timestamps obtained in step r1:2 are equals the read protocol ends.
r2:1 Otherwise the client performs the write back phase for the highest timestamp. This is
identical to phase 3 of writing (steps w3:1, w3:2 and w3:3), except that the client needs
to send only to servers that are out of date, and it must wait only for enough responses
to ensure that a quorum (2f + 1) of servers now have the updated information.
Pseudocodes 3 and 4 present the read protocol executed by clients and
servers, respectively. Readings are completed in only one phase when there areno faults and concurrency on the system. However, an additional writeback phase
[12] may be need, where clients write back the reading value in an enough num-
ber of servers, ensuring that the most recent information is stored in at least one
quorum of servers.
Pseudocode 4 Read protocol executed at server i.
Upon receipt of hREAD;noncei from client c
r1.1 i sends a reply hREAD REPLY;data;Pcert;noncei to c.
The read protocol executed at servers is very simple. In these operations,
servers send a reply containing the stored value and the certicate that proves
the integrity of this data.
Correctness. The correctness conditions of PBFT-CUP, as the proofs that
PBFT-CUP meets these conditions, are equals to those presented in [10], since
these conditions are based on the validity of certicates and on the properties of
quorum intersections. The atomicity of the register [8] is ensured by the write
back phase of the read, i.e., writing back the read value ensures that all subse-
quent reads would read this value or a newer one. Wait-freedom is satisied due
to the fact that all phases of the protocols require replies of only n   f servers
(a quorum), which are, by denition, always available on the system.
3.2 Optimizations
There are two optimizations that can be used to make the protocols more ecient
in contention- and fault-free scenarios.
Avoiding the prepare phase of a write. As in BFT-BC (see Section 2.2),
it is possible to agglutinate the functions of the phases 1 and 2 of the write
protocol of PBFT-BC, reducing the number of communication steps from 6 to 4
in writes in which there are no faulty servers and no write contention. The idea is
simple: if all timestamps read by a client c on the rst phase of the write protocol
are equal to ts, the obtained READ TS REPLY messages can be used as the
prepare certicate for a timestamp succ(ts;c). In order for this optimization to
be used, the hash of the value to be written must be included both in READ TS
and READ TS REPLY messages.
Avoiding verication of partial signatures. Two of the most costly steps of
the threshold signature scheme are: (1) verication of partial signatures (steps
w2:2 and w3:2 of Pseudocode 1), executed by clients; and (2) generation of proofs
of partial signatures validity (steps w2:5 and w3:3 of Pseudocode 2), executed
by servers. In these steps, if there are no malicious servers in the system, the
rst quorum of replies received by clients will contain correct partial signatures
that suce to generate the service signature. So, we can change the algorithm
to make the client rst try to combine the rst quorum of partial signatures
received without verifying them. If some invalid partial signature is used in the
combination, the service signature generated will be invalid for the data thatthe client is trying to obtain a signature. In this case, the client must wait for
new partial signatures and make all possible combinations (using one quorum
of partial signatures) until that it obtains a valid signature. Notice that, in the
worst case, the client receives f invalid partial signatures in the rst quorum
of replies and must wait for more f replies in order to obtains a valid service
signature. Moreover, as the system always has at least a quorum of correct
servers, it is always possible to get a valid signature. In the fault-free case, this
optimization drastically reduces the cryptographic processing time required in
the write operations. Another advantage of this optimization is related with the
proactive recovery of servers (Section 3.3), where their keys (verication keys
and partial keys) are updated. Since clients do not verify the received partial
signatures, they also do not need update the server verication key after the
server recovery. Alternatively, to avoid many combinations in scenarios with
failures, the client could execute the normal protocol when it does not obtain
the correct service signature from the rst quorum of replies.
3.3 Proactive Recovery
Most Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols consider that only a limited number of
servers can fail during the system lifetime. However, many systems are designed
to remain in operation for a long time (long lived systems), making this assump-
tion problematic: given a sucient amount of time, an adversary can manage to
compromise more than f servers and corrupt the system.
To overcome this, we have developed a recovery protocol5 that makes faulty
replicas behave correctly again. Thus, PBFT-BC can tolerate any number of
failures provided that only a limited number of faults f occurs concurrently
within a small time interval, called window of vulnerability.
To recover a server, it is necessary execute the following actions: (1) reboot
the system (both, hardware and congurations); (2) reload the code from a safe
place (e.g., read-only memory); (3) recover the server state, that might have
been corrupted; and (4) make obsolete any information that an attacker might
have obtained (e.g., keys and vulnerabilities) from compromissed servers.
Additional Assumptions
To implement automatic recovery (without administrators), some additional as-
sumptions are necessary. We use the same assumptions of [4]:
Key Pairs. Each process handles a pair of keys (public and private from an
asymmetric cryptosystem). Private keys are known only to each owner, however
all processes know all public keys (through certicates). These keys are only used
to reestablish authenticated channels between processes, i.e., to share a secret.
5 As a Byzantine-faulty replica may appear to behave properly even when compro-
mised, the recovery must be proactive, i.e., even correct servers must execute the
recovery procedure.Secure Cryptography. Each server has a secure cryptographic coprocessor that
stores its private key. Thus, it can sign and decrypt messages without exposing
the private key. This coprocessor also contains a counter that never goes back-
wards. The value of this counter is appended in each signed messages in order
to avoid replay attacks. An example of co-processor that can be used to provide
this service is the TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [19], already available in
many commodity PCs.
Read-Only Memory. Each server stores the public keys of other servers, as
well as the service public key PK, in some memory that survives failures with-
out being corrupted. Moreover, a hash of the server code is also stored in this
memory.
Watchdog Timer. Each server has a watchdog timer that periodically inter-
rupts processing and hands control to a recovery monitor, which is stored in
the read-only memory. An attacker is not able to change the rate of watchdog
interruptions without having physical access to the machine.
Diversity in Time. The set of vulnerabilities of each replica is modied after
each recovery. This ensures that an adversary will not use the same attack to
compromise a server imediatelly after its recovery. This can be implemented
through a combination of techniques [3] such as changing the operating system of
the replica (to modify the set of vulnerabilities), using memory randomization (to
modify the address layout of the server) and changing conguration parameters
of the system.
Modied Protocol
The main change in the protocol is related with the windows of vulnerability.
Each window has a number that is dened in increasing order. Servers append the
number of the window of vulnerability in the replies, i.e., there is an additional
parameter indicating in which window of vulnerability is the server. A client
knows that servers have moved to the next window when it receives at least
f +1 replies indicating this change in the system. Moreover, prepare certicates
also have an additinal attribute to inform in which window it was created.
Sometimes, a client may restart one phase of a write operation concurrent
with a recovery procedure. This can happen in phases 2 and 3, when a client is
trying to obtain the service signature for a certicate. In fact, servers partial keys
are updated by the recovery procedure, but a service signature is correctly gen-
erated only if all partial signatures are performed with partial keys of the same
window of vulnerability. On the other hand, recovery does not aect read oper-
ations, unless, of course, while the server is rebooting and becomes unavailable
for a short time.
The time to recover a server can be divided into three parts (Figure 2): Tr
{ time to restart the system; Tk { time to update keys (patial keys and session
keys); and Ts { time to update the server state. A window of vulnerability
starts at the begining of a recovery procedure and ends when the next recovery
procedure ends (Figure 2). In this period, up to f out of 3f +1 servers can fail.Tr Tk Ts Tr Tk Ts Tr Tk Ts
(w+1) Window of vulnerability
Window of vulnerability (w)
Time
Fig.2. Relationship between windows of vulnerability and recovery procedures.
It is impossible to develop protocols for proactive recovery in completely
asynchronous systems [18], where we can not make any time assumption. Then,
there is the problem of ensuring the periodic execution of the recovery procedure.
Also, we must nd ways to guarantee that this protocol ends.
To solve the rst problem we use watchdogs timers that generate periodic in-
terrupts. The second problem is much more complicated and should be solved in
one of three ways: (1) assume (and justify this assumption!) that an adversary
can not control the communication channels connecting two correct processes
[22]; (2) use an hybrid distributed system, where the recovery procedure is per-
formed in a synchronous and secure subsystem [17,5]; or (3) whether the recovery
timeout expires, the server can contact an administrator that can take actions
to allow the recovery to terminate [4]. Any of these methods can be incorporated
in our system. The steps to recover a server are given bellow:
System Reboot. Each server restarts periodically when the watchdog timer goes
o. Before rebooting, each server sends a message to inform other servers that
it will perform the recovery, i.e., it is going to the next window of vulnerability.
Any correct server that receives f +1 of these messages also restarts, even if its
watchdog timer is not expired. This improves availability because the servers do
not have to wait for their times to expire before changing to the next window
of vulnerability. Moreover, the recovery monitor saves the state of the server
(data and Pcert) and its keys (partial key and verication key). Then, it reboots
the system with correct code and restarts the server from the saved state. The
integrity of the operating system and service code can be veried through the
hashes of them stored in the read-only memory. If the copy of the code stored
by the server is corrupt, the recovery monitor can fetch the correct code from
other servers. Thus, it is guaranteed that the server code is correct and it did not
lose its state. This state may be corrupted but the server must use it to process
requests during the recovery phase in order to ensure the system properties when
the recovering server is correct. Otherwise, the recovery procedure could cause
more faults than the maximum tolerated by the system. But the recovering server
could be faulty. So, the state should be updated, together with all condential
data that an attacker might have obtained (partial and session keys).
Keys Update. Session keys are updated as in [4]: the process i updates its
session key used to authenticate a channel to other process j, by sending to j a
secret that must be encrypted with the public key of j (thus, only j is able to
access this secret) and signed with the private key of i (ensuring authenticity).So, a new session key is established to authenticate messages that i sends to j.
These messages are signed by the secure coprocessor that appends the value of
the counter (count) to avoid replay attacks, i.e., the count must be larger than
the value of the last message that j has received from i. Moreover, the servers
update its partial and verication keys through a proactive update protocol such
as APSS [22]. In this procedure, the asymmetric keys of the servers are used to
exchange condential data.
State Update. Each server recovers its state by performing a normal read op-
eration on a quorum of servers (considering himself). The value read is used to
update the variables data and Pcert. Other variables are reset to the same value
that they had in the boot of the system, i.e., Plist to a empty set and maxts to
null. These variables are used to avoid that malicious clients prepare many write
operations. As these variables are \lost" in the recovery procedure, we use the
following mechanism to control the actions of clients: as each prepare certicate
contains the value w of the window of vulnerability, servers do not consider cor-
rect (in the third phase of the write) prepare certicates generated in previous
windows of vulnerability. Thus, if a client receives replies from f +1 servers indi-
cating that they have advanced to the next window of vulnerability, such client
must restart the second phase of the write protocol and wait for responses from
a quorum of servers that are in the new window. We could relax this requirement
by accepting certicates generated in the previous window of vulnerability. In
that case, a malicious client is able to prepare at most two (without optimization
{ 3 phases) or four (with optimization { 2 phases) write operations.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the PBFT-BC performance by comparing it with its
precursor, the BFT-BC [10].
Analytical Evaluation. Both PBFT-BC and BFT-BC have read and write
protocols with linear communication complexity (O(n)) and the same number
of communication steps: 2 for reads (4 under write-contention) and 4 for writes (6
under write-contention). However, the messages of PBFT-BC are much smaller
than the messages in BFT-BC due to the size of its certicates. A certicate
of BFT-BC requires 2f + 1 signed messages from a quorum of servers, while in
PBFT-BC, the certicate requires a single threshold signature. This represents
an improvement by a a factor of 2f + 1 in terms of message size for PBFT-BC.
Even more important than lowering message sizes, are the bennets of PBFT-
BC in terms of the number cryptographic operations required by the protocols.
Table 1 presents an analysis of the cryprographic costs to write a value in the
system. As shown in the table, BFT-BC executes verications in quadratic order
(O(f2)), while for PBFT-BC this cost is linear (O(f)). This happens because
both protocols verify a quorum of certicates (rst phase), where in BFT-BC
each certicate is validated by a quorum of signatures and in PBFT-BC by only
one signature. This cost is also reected in read operations, where, discarding
a possible write back phase, BFT-BC executes 4f2 + 4f + 1 verications while
PBFT-BC executes only 2f + 1 verications at client side.BFT-BC PBFT-BC
Phase client server client server
1
a 4f
2 + 4f + 1 verify | 2f + 1 verify |
2
a 2f + 1 verify 4f + 2 verify 1 comb of 2f + 1 2 verify
+ 1 sign partial signatures + 1 partial sign
3
a 2f + 1 verify 2f + 1 verify 1 comb of 2f + 1 1 verify
+ 1 sign partial signatures + 1 partial sign
Total 4f
2 + 8f + 3 verify 6f + 3 verify 2f + 1 verify 3 verify
Costs + 2 sign + 2 comb + 2 partial sign
4f
2 + 14f + 6 verify + 2 sign 2f + 4 verify + 2 partial sign + 2 comb
Table 1. Write protocol costs for a scenario without failures.
Experimental Evaluation. To better ilustrate the bennets of PBFT-BC
when compared with BFT-BC we run some experiments to observe the latency
of their read and write protocols. In particular, we are interested in observing the
latency to execute read/write operations, since the eects caused by concurrency
and failures is basically the same in both protocols.
We implemented both protocols using the Java programming language6. We
evaluate the protocols without proactive recovery, since they can only impact
the latency of operations executed during the recovery procedures.
In order to quantify this latency, some experiments were conducted in Emu-
lab [20], where we allocate 11 pc3000 machines (3.0 GHz 64-bit Pentium Xeon
with 2GB of RAM and gigabit network cards) and a 100Mbs switched network.
The network is emulated as a VLAN congured in a Cisco 4509 switch where
we add a non-negligible latency of 10ms in the communications. The software
installed on the machines was Red Hat Linux 6 with kernel 2.4.20 and Sun's
32-bit JRE version 1.6.0 02. All experiments were done with the Just-In-Time
(JIT) compiler enabled, and run a warm-up phase to transform the bytecode
into native code.
In the experiments, we use the standard 512-bits RSA signature in the BFT-
BC and we congure the threshold signature scheme to generate RSA signatures
of 512 bits in the PBFT-BC. The size of the objects, that were written and
read from the system, was xed in 1024 bytes. Then, we set the system with 4
(f = 1), 7 (f = 2) or 10 (f = 3) servers to analyze its scalability. We executed
each operation 1000 times and obtained the mean time discarding the 5% values
with greater variance.
Figure 3 presents the latency observed in the execution of each operation.
We can see in this gure that PBFT-BC outperforms the performance of the
BFT-BC. This happens mainly because the optimization in PBFT-BC write
operations (verications of partial signatures are avoided { Section 3.1) and
due to the fact that PBFT-BC certicates have constant small size (only one
signature), while BFT-BC certicates contains a quorum of signatures.
In fact, the total number of bytes exchanged by the client and each PBFT-BC
server was approximately 2756 to write an object and 1466 to read an object,
6 For threshold cryptography, we adapt the library found at http://threshsig.sf.
net/, which is an implementation of the protocol described in [16].for all congurations of the system. On the other hand, using the BFT-BC
protocol, these numbers increase to 5884/2229, 8120/2824 e 10292/3419 bytes for
write/read operations in the system composed by 4, 7 or 10 servers, respectively.
Other point to highlight is the low time need to produce a partial signature
(aprox. 4:5ms) and to combine a quorum of these signatures (0:45ms for quorum
of 3 servers). The time necessary to produce a standard RSA signature was
approx. 1:5ms and each verication spent approx. 0:26ms, in both protocols.
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These results clearly shows the benets of using threshold signatures instead
of signature sets to build certicate in quorum systems.
5 Related Work
There are many works that propose register implementation using quorum sys-
tem protocols for dierent fault models (crash or malicious) and consistency
semantics (safe, regular or atomic). The rst protocols that tolerate malicious
behavior of processes are presented in [11,12]. These works address two types
of quorum systems: (1) f-dissemination quorum system, which does not allow
the presence of malicious clients and requires 3f + 1 servers; and (2) f-masking
quorum system, which allows the presence of malicious clients but requires 4f+1
servers. Moreover, the writeback phase of the read protocol was introduced in
[12]. This phase guarantees the atomic semantics of the operations performed
on the system.
The quorum system more similar to PBFT-BC is the BFT-BC [10]. This
system also tolerates malicious clients, requiring only 3f + 1 servers. BFT-BC
uses server signatures to guarantee the integrity of the stored data. The main
dierence of our work is the use of threshold cryptography to make data self-
veriable. This approach improves signicantly the performance of the system,
makes possible the update of the shares (partial keys) stored on the servers
and facilitates the development of proactive servers recovery protocols since the
clients keys do not need be changed.
Some protocols for proactive recovery of servers were proposed in [4,21,13].
Our protocol uses the same assumptions adopted in [4], that presents a protocol
for active replication, but does not use threshold cryptography for signatures.
Other works that use threshold cryptography are COCA [21], that implements afault-tolerant online certication authority, and CODEX [13], that implements
a distributed service for storage and dissemination of secrets. These works em-
ploy the APSS [22] proactive secret sharing protocol to update the shares of a
service private key. Our protocol also employ the APSS protocol. However, the
architectures of COCA and CODEX systems are signicantly dierent from the
adopted in our work. These systems use a server, called delegate, to presides
over the processing of each client request. The use of delegates decrease the per-
formance of the system since that are necessary more communication steps to
perform an operation. Moreover, the additional assumptions for proactive recov-
ery, assumed by COCA and CODEX, seem to be insucient to guarantee the
progress of the system [18]. The architecture Steward [1] also utilizes threshold
cryptography, but it is used to guarantee the authenticity of a decision made by
a set of processes.
6 Conclusions and Future Works
In this work we proposed a new protocol for Byzantine Quorum systems, the
PBFT-BC, which tolerates malicious clients, presents optimal resilience and sup-
plies a register with atomic semantics of operations. Moreover, we developed a
protocol for proactive recovery of servers that implement the PBFT-BC. Also,
we showed that PBFT-BC outperforms the performance of BFT-BC protocol,
which implements a service with the same characteristics.
The next steps of this work will focus on extending this model to operate in
a dynamic environment, where processes can join and leave the system at any
time. In this direction, the use of threshold cryptography provides the necessary
exibility to make the PBFT-BC protocol adaptable to the changes that occur
in the composition of the servers group.
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